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THE USE OF INJUNCTIONS IN LABOR DISPUTES.
Our present system of jurisprudence contains two distinct di-
visions-law and equity. Equity exists, just as in the past, to afford
relief which the law by reason of its so-called "universality" is unable
to grant. Inasmuch as the primary tribunal is the law court, an
action in equity must first of all allege that there is no plain, adequate
and complete remedy at law. To render equity proceedings effective,
the enjoining writ or injunction issues as the order of the court
which must be obeyed. The injunction assumes two forms, one man-
datory, the other prohibitory. The former commands the perform-
ance of specific acts; the latter seeks to prevent acts which threaten
irreparable injury to civil and property rights.
Within the scope of this latter category falls the use of the
injunction with which labor is particularly concerned. Equity courts
have so defined "property" as to make it include "business"; the
protection afforded property rights is similarly granted to business
rights. This principle once established spread with much rapidity.
When, in 1868, an English court of equity issued an injunction to
restrain the issuance of certain placards during a strike, the courts
in America quickly followed suit.
All the previously developed machinery of the injunction with
its temporary issuance and permanent forms was utilized to meet the
troubled situation arising from the labor disputes which became
numerous during the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
It follows that the worker will often plead that the courts have
absolutely no precedent for their use of the injunction in the above
indicated manner. To this contention the jurists will reply, "Every
just order or rule known to equity courts was born of some emer-
gency to meet some new conditions, and was therefore, in its time,
without a precedent. If based on sound principles, and beneficent
results follow their enforcement, affording necessary relief to the
one party without imposing illegal burdens on the other, new remedies
and not unprecedented orders are not unwelcome aids to the chancel-
lor to meet the constantly varying demands for equitable relief.",
A review of the various uses of the injunction in labor disputes
will furnish a proper basis for a discerning attitude in the entire
matter. I shall therefore indicate the relation of the enjoining order
to the strike, the boycott, the picket, and finally to contempt pro.
ceedings-as all are established by judicial decisions. Some of the
I Judge Taft in Toledo Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 730-1893.
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fundamental, specific problems which are therein discussed may resolve
themselves into the following significant questions: Do the rights ot
the employer which equity protects genuinely belong to equity jur-
isdictions? Should acts, perfectly innocent otherwise, be forbidden
because of a wrongful underlying motive? When the action of an
individual is lawful, is the same action by a combination of indi-
viduals unlawful? Does not summary punishment for contempt vio-
late certain constitutional provisions as to the right of trial by jury?
PART I-INJUNCTION IN RELATION TO STRIKES
STRIKE DEFINED. It is a long-established axiom that any genu-
ine study of a subject requires 'a definition of terms as the first step
in an intelligent consideration of it. About the meaning of an appar-
ently simple and plain phrase may revolve a bitter controversy. Vary
the definition of strike and the judicial interpretation will vary with it.
Thus, Judge Jenkins in the case of Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.
v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co.,2 after summing up the various defini-
tions obtainable declared, "There are running through all of them
two controlling ideas: First, by compulsion to extort from the em-
ployer the concession demanded; second, a cessation of labor, but
not the abandonment of employment." This decision, therefore, main-
tains that a "Strike is essentially a conspiracy to extort by violence."
A later ruling by a higher court reversing it states that orderly with-
drawal and simultaneous cessation of work properly define the term.
INJUNCTION AGAINST ACT OF CEASING WORK. The general rule
may at once be formulated. Although a strike may be illegal or
criminal it cannot be enjoined. In the Farmers' Loan case an injunc-
tion actually issued against a strike. The receivers of the company
obtained the injunction forbidding the employees of the railroad to quit
their service. When the union officers objected, Judge Jenkins did
not deny the right of the men to stop work. He insists "But it does
not follow that one has the absolute right to abandon that which he
has undertaken without regard to time and conditions. ..... His
right of abandonment is limited by the assumption of that service, and
the conditions and exigencies attaching thereto. It would be mon-
strous if a surgeon, upon demand and refusal of larger compensation
could lawfully abandon an operation partially performed, leaving his
knife in the bleeding body of the patient."
In conclusion, it is declared that the men could only strike after
they had given reasonable notice. The case was appealed, and under
260 Fed. 803-1894.
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the title of Arthur V. Oakes,3 the decision as stated was reversed.
Here Justice Harlan asserted that to tell a man he must not strike
was equivalent to "a condition of involuntary servitude which the
Supreme Court of the land declares shall not exist within the United
States."
Even in the case of the operation of railroads where the public is
primarily concerned, it was held that there was no justification for a
"departure from the general rule that equity will not compel the
actual affirmative performance of merely personal services." This
decision has firmly established the principle that no injunction can ever
issue against the act of ceasing employment.
LGAsiTY OF Acrs OF UNION OFFICERS. Mr. Bryan has sum-
marized well the specific things which the courts have permitted the
unions to do.4 "Unions are permitted to organize, elect officers,
adopt reasonable by-laws to which all shall be subject, and govern
themselves by the rules of the majority. They may adopt scales of
wages, below which their members may be forbidden to work; and
apportion apprentices among employers according to the number of
workmen each employs. Penalties may be imposed upon members
for violation of the by-laws, for which the Union may sue. The
officers may be clothed with the authority to call upon members to
quit work, on penalty of expulsion, and the union may pay the
expenses of those who are out on strike. In general, so long as the
combination pursues legitimate objects with lawful means, it is sub-
ject to no interference by any part of law or equity."
A most interesting opinion as to the limitations upon the acts of
strikers was enunciated by Justice Brewer' in 1885. It aptly states
the law and although lengthy it deserves for its concise statement of
the principles at issue to be quoted in large part. "I think a few
preliminary considerations, in reference to the common rights which
we all have as free men in this country, may not be amiss. Every
man has a right to work for whom he pleases and to go where he
pleases, and to do what he pleases, providing, in so doing, he does not
trespass on the rights of others. And every man who seeks another
to work for him has a right to contract with that man, to make such
an agreement with him as will be mutually satisfactory; and unless he
has made a contract binding him to a stipulated time, he may right-
fully say to such employee at any time, "I have no further need for
your services."
8 63 Fed. 310-1894.
4 American Law Review 42.
5 United States v. Kane, 23 Fed. 748-1885.
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Now it is well to come down to simple things. Supposing Mr.
Wheeler has a little farm of 20 acres. He comes to Mr. Orr and
says to him, "Here, work for me, will you?" and Mr. Orr goes to
work for him under some contract. Now, every one of us realizes
the fact that if Mr. Orr is tired of working there, if he does not think
the pay is satisfactory, or if it is a mere whim of his, he has a right
to say, "Mr. Wheeler, I won't work for you any more," and Mr.
Wheeler would have no right to do anything. Mr. Orr is a free
man, and can work for whom he pleases, and as long as he pleases
and quit when he pleases; and that right which Mr. Orr has Mr.
Wheeler has also. The fact that Mr. Wheeler happens to be an
employer does not abridge his freedom. If he is tired of Mr. Orr's
work, or if he dislikes the man, or if he does not want any more of
his assistance on his place, he can say to Mr. Orr, and say very
properly, "I have paid you for all the time you have worked; now you
can leave, and seek work elsewhere." Those are common, every-day,
simple rules of right and wrong we all recognize. Nobody doubts
that. Nobody would think for a moment, in a simple case of that
kind, of questioning the right, either of Mr. Orr to quit or of Mr.
Wheeler to say, "You may leave." And that which is true in these
simple matters where there is a little piece of property, and a single
owner, is just as true when there is a large property and a large num-
ber of employees. Rules of right and wrong, obligations of employer
and obligations of employee do not change because the property
is in the one instance a little bit of real estate, and in the other
a large railroad property; and if we apply these simple, commonplace
rules of right and wrong we avoid, oftentimes, a great many of the
troubles into which we come.
Let us move on a little further to another matter. Suppose Mr.
Wheeler had two men employed, and that he finds that in the man-
agement of his little farm he is not making enough so that he can
afford to employ two laborers, and he says to one of them: "I will
have to get along without your services, and I will do with the serv-
ices of the other," and the one leaves. That is all right. Supposing
the one that leaves goes to the one who has not left and says to him:
"Now, look here; leave with me," giving whatever reasons he sees
fit, whatever reasons he can adduce, and the other one says: "Well,
I will leave," and he leaves because his co-laborer has persuaded him
to leave-has urged him to leave; that is all right. Mr. Wheeler has
nothing to say; he may think that the reasons which the one that
is leaving has given to the one that he would like to have stay are
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol4/iss1/3
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frivilous, not such as ought to induce him to leave, but that is those
gentlemen's business. If the one whom he would like to have stay
is inclined to go because his friend has urged him, has persuaded him,
has induced him to leave, Mr. Wheeler cannot say anything. That is
the right of both these men-the one to make suggestions, give rea-
sons, and the other to listen to them, and act upon them.
But suppose that one is discharged and the other wants to
stay, is satisfied with the employment; and the one that leaves goes
around to a number of friends and gathers them, and they come
around, a large party of them-a party with revolvers and mus-
kets-and the one that leaves comes to the one that wants to stay
and says to him: "Now, my friends are here; you had better leave, I
request you to leave;" the man looks at the party that is standing
there; there is nothing but a simple request-that is, so far as the
language which is used; there is no threat; but it is a request backed
by a demonstration intended to intimidate, calculated to intimidate,
and the man says: "Well, I would like to stay, I am willing to work
here, yet there are too many men here, there is too much of a dem-
onstration; I am afraid to say." Now, the common sense of every
man tells him that that is not a mere request-tells him that while
the language used may be very polite and be merely in the form of a
request, yet it is accompanied with that backing of force intended as
a demonstration and calculated to make an impression and that the
man leaves, really because he is intimidated.
If 1 take another illustration I will make it even more plain.
Suppose half a dozen men stop a coach, with revolvers in their
hands, and one man asks the passengers politely to step out and pass
over their valuables, and suppose those men should be put on trial
before any court for robbery, would not you laugh at that one who
would say, "Why, there was no violence; there were no threats; there
was simply a request to those passengers to hand over their valuables
and they handed them over; it was simply a request and a loan of
their valuables." Would not the common sense of every man say
that that request, no matter how politely it was expressed, was a
request backed by a demonstration of force that was really intimi-
dation, and made the offense robbery? Would not you expect any
judge to say that? Would not you ridicule any one that would say
otherwise? .
Then there is another proposition that comes in-a familiar rule
of law-that where a party of men combine, with the intent to do
an unlawful thing, and in the prosecution of that unlawful intent
Washington University Open Scholarship
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one of the party goes a step beyond the balance of the party, and
does acts which the balance do not themselves perform, all are re-
sponsible for what the one does. In order to make that rule of law
applicable, there must be a concert of action; an agreement to do some
unlawful thing. If there is no such agreement, no such preconcert of
action, then each individual is responsible simply for what he
does. Thus, for instance, if there should happen to gather here on
the street 50 or 100 or 200 men, with no preconcert of purpose, acci-
dentally meeting here, and a street fight should develop in their midst,
all of that crowd are not responsible for it; that would be unjust; that
would be unfair; because they did not go there, they did not meet
together, with a preconcerted purpose to do anything unlawful, and,
although something unlawful may be done in that crowd, yet only
they are at fault who do the unlawful thing. But if they all met, as
I said, for the purpose of doing some unlawful act, having formed
beforehand the purpose to do it, and are present there to carry that
purpose into effect, then every man, by virtue of uniting in that pre-
conceived purpose to do the unlawful thing, makes himself responsible
for what any one does.
A familiar illustration which often comes before a court is this:
Supposing three or four men form a purpose to commit burglary, and
break into a house for the purpose of committing that burglary;
that is all they had intended to do; that is the unlawful act, and the
single unlawful act, which they had set out to accomplish; they get
into the house and somebody wakes up, and one of the party shoots
and kills. Now, the three or four persons who went into that house
never formed beforehand the intent to kill anybody; they simply went
in there to commit buriglary; but, combining to do that unlawful thing,
in the prosecution of the burglary, and to make it successful, onL
of the party shoots and kills, and the law comes in and says: "All
of you are guilty of murder; we do not discriminate between you;
you broke into that house to commit burglary; in prosecution of that
burglarious entrance one of your party committed murder; all are
guilty."
Now that is a reasonable rule, when you stop to think of it; it
is not a mere harsh, arbitrary, technical rule which the courts have
laid down, and the statutes have established; it is a rule intended to
prevent combinations or conspiracies to do an unlawful thing, and
where there are many together it is often difficult to distinguish the
one who does any particular act."
In the recent case of Tri-City Trades v. American Steel Foun-
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dries,6 the court held that where the strike was for the legitimate
purpose of obtaining higher wages, the commission of some unlawful
acts by the strikers would not taint the entire purpose itself with unlaw-
fulness, so as to entitle the employer to an injunction against lawful
acts in furtherance of such legitimate purpose.
It was contended in this case, moreover, that the strikers had no
right to interfere with other employes, because as strikers they could
have no interest in the company for which they no longer v;,orked.
To this it was answered that a strike does not fully terminate its
relationship of the parties so as to make the strikers mere intermed-
dles, since the strike creates a new and anomalous relationship that is
neither that of a general employer and employee or that of employer
and employee seeking work from them as strangers.
The case of Stephens v. Ohio Telephone Co.,' provided for an
injunction in favor of telephone subscribers against strikers' inter-
ference with their service on the grounds that the union admittedly
was seeking to interfere with the business of the company.
The court declared that such an avowed intention would almost
make the action of the unionists an unlawful conspiracy. Their pri-
mary purpose should have been to improve their own conditions. Any
damage which the employer might suffer in that contingency would
be merely incidental and would not be "illegal interference."
INJUNCTION AGAINST LEGAL AcTS WITH WRONGFUL MOTIVE.
Passirg to a consideration of the materiality of motive in acts which
are per se lawful, two conflicting views are found. One holds that a
legal act cannot be made illegal by the motive which underlies it. The
other maintains that when the motive is malicious and is based upon
a desire to injure the rights of others, the strike is wrong, and even
innocent acts in pursuance of it are illegal.
The first view was propounded by Judge Parker in the case of
National Protective Association v. Cummings.s An injunction had
been requested for the purpose of restraining the union from striking
to procure the discharge of members of a rival organization. In his
decision, Judge Parker refused to admit that the motive behind the
act of striking could make the act unlawful. He asserts, "It seems
to me illogical and little short of absurd to say that the every-day
acts of the business world, apparently within the domain of compe-
tion, may be either lawful or unlawful according to the motives of
the actor."
'238 Fed. 728, 1917.
T 240 Fed. 760, 1917.9 63 N. E. 369-1902.
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When the right to form organizations for purposes of improving
working conditions is conceded, it follows that combinations may be
formed to do what an individual may do. In other words, the priv-
ileges that one man has with reference to choice of conditions of
labor, many in combination have. If one stops working because he
chooses to, many working under the same conditions or organized
for mutual advantage, may do the same because they choose, even if
it is through the organization that they have learned of the advantage,
and because of it that they have made their choice. The advantage
of acting together is an advantage that belongs to all combination;
combination of capital, of employers, and of all others as well as of
laborers.
The opposite view of the question of motive emphasizes first, the
common law rule which holds that any combination to affect wages
is an injury to trade and therefore an unlawful conspiracy. Those
acts, by agreement which are oppressive, immoral or wrongfully preju-
dicial to the rights of others can be punished as conspiracy. Thus the
motive is the sole consideration. The argument continues,' "But as one
man cannot commonly do much harm by ceasing to work even with an
evil motive, the matter yields to the personal right of such a man to
cease work anyway. When many unite to cease at the same time, the
chance of accomplishing the unlawful motive becomes greater. This be-
comes a basis for holding that the motive makes the strike wrong. Or
again, the acts of many in combination increase the chances for success,
and therefore undue pressure is brought to bear upon the employer.
This may be coercion and the wrong lies in combination of many. to do
what one alone might do."
The courts have gradually advanced from this position to a more
liberal interpretation of personal rights. However, they have not
all gone as far as Judge Parker when he declared that laborers may
strike for any reason that seems sufficient to them.
INJUNCTION APPLIED TO OFFICERS OV. UNION. When it is con-
sidered that a strike may be effectually hindered by injunction against
the officers of a union, it is well to state just what acts will be per-
mitted and what acts of officers will be enjoined.
Where officers order a strike in good faith and for the advance-
ment of lawful interests, their act is legal, and no injunction will lie
against them. (Wabash Ry. Co. v. Hannahan.) 10 Further, any injury
that may be caused by the strike is damnum absque injuria, meaning
'Groat: "Attitude of American Courts in Labor Cases." p. 76.
10 121 Fed. 563-1903.
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a loss without any real injury, and for which no damages may b.
recovered.
"The officers may order strikes for increased wages, to obtain the
reinstatement of a wrongfully discharged member" National Protec-
tive Association v. Cumming)," to compel an employer to observe a
legal by-law of the union, to better the conditions of service--in
short, to secure any legal benefit to the union which may fairly repel
any presumption of malice arising from the intentional infliction of
injury upon the employer.
The late case of Bossert v. Dhuy 12 followed the rule as estab-
lished in National Protective Association v. Cumming. An injunc-
tion was denied to the New York employers as against the officers
of the Carpenters' Union. The defendants had forbade their union
men to work on any non-union product. Such action was here
held to constitute a direct benefit to the laborers, and accordingly
no malice was imputed to them. The court declares that the officers
induced no employes to lreak their contracts of employment, that the
employers were not singled out for a strike against them alone, that
there was no intent to injure the good will or business of the plaintiffs,
and hence that no injunction would issue.
Again, the officers may be enjoined from calling a strike, to pre-
vent an employer from making a just discrimination against inferior
labor, to drive him into an association of master workmen recognized
by the union (Coons v. Chrystie)23 ; to enforce a boycott against a
third person (Beattie v. Callahan)"; where the strike would amount
to undue interference with interstate commerce (Toledo Ry. Co. v.
Pennsylvania Co."5 ; or, where the officers are merely wielding their
powers for personal advancement and to gratify their own malicious
feelings. In general, where the benefit to the union is not sufficient
justification and where the strike is merely to injure the employer,
the courts will restrain the acts of officers in calling it.
Justice Braley in Snow v. Chadwick" enjoined the officers
of an iron workers' union from calling a strike which would inter-
fere with a contract entered into by the employer to install
certain outside iron work upon a building. The court declared
after citing authorities, "The right of the plaintiff to the benefit of
its contract and to remain undisturbed by the union during perform-
" Cited Above.
11221 N. Y. 342, 1917.
21 24 Misc. 296-189.
1481 N. Y. Supp. 413.
154 Fed. 730-1893.
2s 227 Mass., 382, 1917.
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ance, as well as to hire and retain such employees as it might select
unhampered by the interference of the union is a primary right.
An intentional interference with such right without lawful justifica-
tion, is malicious in law, even if it is from good motives and without
express malice."
In the case of Hitchman Coal Co. v. Mitchell, " the plaintiff
was operating a non-union mine under a mutual agreement, assent-
ed to by every employe, that it would not recognize the union,
and that if any man wanted to become a member of the union,
he might do so, but could not be a member and remain in its
employ. Defendant, with full notice of this working agreement
and without any agency for the employes, but as representatives of an
organization of mine workers in other states, sent their agent to the
mine who proceeded by persuasion accompanied by deceptive state-
ments, to induce the employees to join the union, and at the same
time to break their agreement with plaintiff by remaining in its employ
after joining, and this was done, not for the purpose of enlarging
the membership of the union, but of coercing plaintiff through a
strike, or the threat of one, into recognition of the union. Held, that
the purpose and methods were unlawful and not justified and that
plaintiff was entitled to an injunction against such acts.
The matter for decision in Eagle Glass Co. v. Rowe was
very similar to that in the Hitchman case. Here. also, the
plaintiff was operating a non-union plant with contracts with em-
ployes that they would withdraw from their employment if they
desired to become members of a union. The court held that the right
of employees to quit their employment gave third persons (business
agents of union) no right to instigate a strike.
Justice Brandeis dissented in this case and in the Hitchman case
on virtually the same reasoning in each. He declared that the contract
created an employment at will, that it did not bind the employe not
to join the union, and he was free to join it at any time. To violate
this contract, he held, an employe must have both joined the union
and failed to withdraw from the plaintiff's employ. Since there was no
evidence that this had been done the contract was not violated and no
injunction might issue.
When the courts do restrain them from committing certain acts,
they do not enjoin the workmen from striking. They simply bar the
use of union machinery as a weapon in the conflict.
INJUNCTION IN DISPUTE BETWEEN UNION AND NON-UNION MEN.
11245 U. S. 229-1917.
12245 U. S. 275-1917.
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In this field, the decisions are extremely contradictory, and it is ac-
cordingly difficult to lay down general principles. Formerly any
strike to compel the discharge of certain employees was illegal, as
being a restraint upon the business of the employer and upon the
workman's right to labor as he desired.
Now, however, a union may demand dismissal of non-members,
if thereby they intend only to advance their own legitimate and ma-
terial interests. If, however, the union undertakes to deprive a work-
man of his place, out of malice then its acts may be enjoined. This
proposition is not so completely approved, as here again we have
entering the question of motive.
The whole matter revolves about the question: What is justi-
fiable cause in procuring the dismissal of one employee for others?
When some substantial immediate benefit can be obtained for the
union, they might strike for the dismissal of an employee. This would
be the situation in a demand for the removal of men who are per-
sonally obnoxious to their fellows (Clemitt v. Watson)"3 . Similarly-
incompetent, careless men, whose awkwardness and neglect threaten
injury about them, furnish proper grounds for a lawful strike. Again,
the union may attempt to obtain positions for its members by causing
the employer to discharge non-members; since "anyone . . . may
procure the discharge by lawful means of another person, in order
that he may obtain employment for himself or another." We have
here merely a phase in the competition of labor.
When a union strikes to make non-members join it, and when
as a result it becomes impossible for the non-members to.get work-
such action is not held to constitute justifiable cause. (Plant v.
Woods'°).
In Bogni v. Perotti,'2 1 the court held that the right to work
was a property right, that any statute declaring the opposite was
unconstitutional, and that one labor union might have an injunction
against another which conspired to deprive plaintiffs of their employ-
ment if they did not join defendant's union.
Any endeavor maliciously to deprive non-union men of work is
unlawful and actionable. The mere -fact that a contract between
a union and an employers' association was entered into to avoid
disputes would not be held to be a justification for depriving non-union
men of work. (Curran v. Galen'2).
19 14 Ind. App., 38-1895.
"57 N. E. 011-1900.21224 Mass., 152-1916.
22 152 N. Y. 33-1897.
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It is always difficult to determine just what is the motive that
leads a union to demand the discharge of certain non-members. One
ruling (that of Judge Parker) holds that unless facts can be adduced
to show that workmen refused to work with non-members solely to
gratify malice, the courts will not hold that a malicious motive exists.
Kemp v. Division No. 241,2 is authority for the proposition that
non-union employees cannot enjoin the officers of a union from
calling a strike of members not bound by any contract, who are
co-employees of the complainants, even though the purpose of the
strike is to compel complainants to join the union or be discharged
from their employment.
In Lucke v. Clothing Cutters," no real malice was shown, and
still the court held that plaintiff had a good cause of action for dam-
ages, when the union refused to admit him on application because
they wanted his discharge.
PART I-INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN BOYCOTTING.
BOYcOTT DFINZD. Any inclusive definition of a boycott requires
a comprehensive survey of a long and varying line of decisions, which
so far as we are concerned make the legal definitions of the term. In
precisely the same way in which the status of the strike has been im-
proved, so also is there a clearly discernible improvement in the
courts' attitude toward the boycott. This trend must be given due
consideration in any worth-while attempt at definition.
The origin of the term "boycott" is narrated in McCarthy's "Eng-
land under Gladstone" (State v. Glidden' 5). The author declares:
"This strike was supported by a form of action or rather inaction,
which soon became historical. Captain Boycott was an Englishman,
an agent of Lord Earne, and a farmer of Lough Mark. In his capacity
as agent he had served notices upon Lord Earne's tenants to vacate,
and the tenantry suddenly retaliated in a most unexpected way by,
in the language of schools and society, sending Captain Boycott to
Coventry in a very thorough manner. The population of the region
for miles round resolved not to have anything to do with him, and as
far as they could prevent it, not to allow any one else to have anything
to do with him. His life appeared in danger, and he had to claim
police protection. His servants fled from him as servants flee from
their masters in some plague-stricken Italian city. The awful sentence
of ex-communication could hardly have rendered him more helplessly
"3225 1I., 213-1913.
",77 Md. 396-1893.2555 Conn. 76-1887.
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alone for a time. No one would work for him-no one would supply
him with food. He and his wife had to work in their own fields them-
selves, in most unpleasant imitation of Theocritan shepherds, and play
out their grim eclogue in their deserted fields with the shadows of
the armed constabulary ever at their heels. The Orangemen of the
north heard of Captain Boycott and his sufferings, and they organized
assistance and sent him down armed laborers from Ulster. To pre-
vent civil war the authorities had to send a force of soldiers and
police to Lough Mark, and Captain Boycott's harvests were brought in
by the armed Ulster laborers, guarded always by the little army."
The term "boycott" was suggested by an Irish priest and given to the
Irish public by an American journalist, Redpath.2
Judge Carpenter, who expounded the decision in this case re-
marked, "If this is a correct picture, the thing we call a boycott
originally signified violence, if not murder."
As opposed to this extreme position, the following definition may
be found in a decision by Judge Halloway in Montana in the case of
Lindsay and Co. v. Montana Federation of Labor.2T "I think that
the verb 'to boycott' does not necessarily mean that the doers employ
violence, intimidation, or other unlawful coercive means; but that it
may be correctly used in the sense of the act of a combination, in
refusing to have business dealings with another until he removes or
ameliorates conditions which are deemed inimical to the welfare of
the members of the combination, or grants concessions which are
deemed to make for that purpose."
Again, in Barr v. Essex Trades Council,23 when the unionists de-
clare that the term boycott has a technical meaning for the members
of the union, and that it simply expresses that members of the union
should merely refrain from trading with those persons who are op-
posed to the union-it is then answered that the boycott notices were
scattered promiscuously and that the public gives the word it gen-
erally accepted meaning. This commonly accepted view contains the
ideas of intimidation, threats, coercive acts which tend to violence, and
other unlawful means which are used to do malicious injury.
Judge Taft in Toledo Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co.?' takes a
more middle ground as follows: "As usually understood, a boycott
is a combination of many to cause a loss to one by coercing others,
against their will to withdraw from him their beneficial business inter-
2s Laidler "Boycotts and the Labor Struggle," p. 24.
2 T96 Pac. 127-1908.
2363 Fed. 310-1894.
"54 Fed. 730-1893.
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course, through threats that, unless others do so, the many will
cause similar loss to them. Ordinarily, when such a combination of
persons does not use violence, actual or threatened to accomplish
their purpose, it is difficult to point out with clearness the illegal
means or end which makes the combination an unlawful conspiracy;
for it is generally lawful for the combiners to withdraw their inter-
course and its benefits from any person, and to announce their inten-
tion of doing so, and it is equally lawful for the others, of their owur
motion, to do that which the combiners seek to compel them to do.
Such combinations are said to be unlawful conspiracies when the
acts are done with malice (i. e. with the intention to injure another
without lawful excuse), even though the acts in themselves and con-
sidered singly are innocent."
This emphasizes the old as well as new question of motive as
it enters into the whole question.
T. S. Adams in his Volume on "Labor Problems" gives the fol-
lowing workable definition": "The boycott may be defined as a com-
bination to suspend dealings with another party, and to persuade and
coerce others to suspend dealings, in order to force this party to com-
ply with some demand, or to punish him for non-compliance in the
past." The author then makes the following classification which will
serve to distinguish between the various types of boycotting: "(1)
The primary boycott; a simple combination of persons to suspend
dealings with a party obnoxious to them, involving no attempt to
coerce third persons to suspend dealings also. (2) The compound
boycott, in which such an effort to coerce third parties is made.
This is the ordinary form of the boycott. (3) The fair list or union
label, placed, respectively, in establishment, or upon goods manu-
factured by union labor and designed to confine the patronage of
trade unionists to employers who accept the union scale and con-
ditions of labor. This is often spoken of as the legal or negative
boycott. (4) The unfair list, published in most trade union journals
hnd containing the names of firms and employers who have offended
the unions, and with whom trade unionists are exhorted to have no
business dealings, whether of purchase or sale, direct or indirect."
A secondary boycott may be defined as an attempt on the part
of the workmen to persuade others not to deal with the boycotted
concern. It differs from the compound boycott in that it uses none
of the coercive or intimidating measures of the compound boycott.
ILLEGALITY OF BOYCOTT AT COMMON LAw, We find that
ao Page 196.
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throughout those cases which have held the boycott illegal there
runs somewhat of the same reasoning. Generally speaking, it is law-
ful for any one to enter into such business relations as are found
mutually agreeable and which will lead to mutual benefit. Freedom
to enter into them implies likewise freedom to refrain. "Refraining
is assumed to be primarily for the benefit of the one who refuses the
relations, and the fact that another may be deprived of an advantage
that would result from such relations cannot be regarded as a loss
to him. But when many combine and by a concerted action refuse
business relations, the case is not parallel with individual action.
Combixation colors the act. The outcome is that the superior right
of the combination forces an agreement that would not otherwise have
been made. This is coercion and therefore unlawful. The lawful
act entered into by many and sought to be accomplished by unlawful
means brings it within the meaning of conspiracy."'" Add to this the
idea of malicious intent or motive which makes legal acts, unlawful,
and the bases for all injunctions against boycott are established. It
must be remembered, of course, that whenever violence of any kind
accompanies the boycott, the injunction will always issue against it.
Intimidation also makes it probable that an injunction will issue
against the boycott. Intimidation, moreover, means more than threats
of violence to person or property. There are other effective methods
used in boycotts. One of them is a threat by a union to order strikes
among the employees of those who will not shun the boycotted per-
son. While the act of striking can no longer be prevented by equity,
union officers may be enjoined from ordering such a strike, and the
boycott thus be made less effective.
In Barr v. Essex Trade Council,32 Vice-Chancellor Green declares,
"the test is, has the injury been inflicted intentionally and without
legal excuse? . . . If the injury which has been sustained, or
which is threatened, is not only the natural, but the inev-
itable consequence of the acts of those who injure, it is
without effect for them to disclaim the intention to injure. It is
folly for a man who deliberately thrusts a firebrand into a rick of
hay to declare after it has been destroyed that he did not intend to
burn it. If a person deliberately discharges a loaded pistol at point-
blank range, directly at the person of another, it is useless for him
to say he did not intend to maim his victim. The law, as a rule,
presumes that a person intends the natural result of his act."
"1 Groat: -American Courts in Labor Cases," p. 112.
", Cited above.
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In a decision by Judge Taft, Thomas v. Cincinnati Ry. Co.,* malic-
ious motive was held to make otherwise lawful acts unlawful. Says Judge
Taft, "The normal operation of competition in trade is the keeping
away or getting away patronage from rivals by inducements offered to
the trading public. The normal operation of the right to labor is the
securing of better terms by refusing to contract to labor except on
such terms. If the workmen of an employer refuse to work for
him except on better terms, at a time when their withdrawal will cause
great loss to him, and they intentionally inflict such loss to coerce him
to come to their terms, they are bona fide excercising their lawful
rights to dispose of their labor for the purpose of lawful gain." The
decision igoes on to state that where the employees have no direct
interest in improving their conditions of employment, and where the
boycott exists merely maliciously to injure the trade of another party
with whom they have no dispute, the employees are not acting within
the law and can therefore be enjoined. Judge Taft declares that in
this case the immediate motive of employees was to show what pun-
ishment and disaster necessarily follow a defiance of their demands.
He holds that the remote motive of wishing to better their condition
by the power so acquired will not make any justification for the
employee's act.
ILLEGALITY UNDER FEDERAL 'ATI-TRUST AcT oF 1890. The ap-
plication of the Sherman anti-trust law to the boycott in particular
and to labor questions in general has been developed by a long and
complicated line of decisions extending from 1903 to 1915-all of
which have come to be included under the title, "The Danbury Hat-
ters' Case." To follow in detail the course of these decisions with
the numerous appeals, reversals and affirmations would be to undertake
a task of doubtful value. It will be sufficient to set forth the impor-
tant principles and rules of law which have been developed in the
course of this twelve year legal controversy.
In 1902, when Loewe refused to unionize his factory, an effect-
ive boycott was carried out against him which damaged his plant to
about the sum of $80,000.00 during a period of about two years.
In 1908, upon request of a lower court, the United States Supreme
Court handed down a decision which interpreted this section of the
Sherman act (Loewe v. Lawlor) 1. It was held here that the Act has
a broader application than the prohibition of restraints of trade, un-
lawfuf at common law. It prohibits any combination which essen-
s U. S. Circ. Ct.. 62 Fed. 803-1894.
34 208 U. S., 274-1908.
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tially obstructs the free flow of commerce between the States, or re-
stricts the liberty of a trader to engage in business; and thus includes
restraints of trade aimed at compelling third parties and strangers in
voluntarily not to engage in the business of interstate trade except
on conditions that the combination imposes. Even if some of the.
acts of the combination are within the state, and the persons in com-
bination are not engaged in interstate commerce, the Act of 1890 will
hold if it can be shown that the deeds of the combination tend to
prevent interstate trade. On the basis of this decision, a jury brought
in a verdict against the union for an amount which was trebled under
the triple damage provision of the Anti-Trust Act.
When the case came to trial again, and in the final Supreme
Court decision of 1915 (Lawlor v. Loewe) 3 5 it was established that
the broadcast circulation of boycott notices among an important group
of customers or possible customers which restrains interstate commerce
constitutes a combination and conspiracy forbidden by the Sherman
Act. The court held that it was not necesasry to demonstrate that
compulsion was used to make out a case under the act.
Further, it was decided that members of the unions who paid
dues and who thus delegated authority to their officers to interfere
unlawfully with the interstate commerce of Mr. Loewe were jointly
liable with such officers for the damages sustained by their acts. In
other words, we have here a decision of the Supreme Court of the
land which fixes the liability of members of unions for acts of their
organization which are in violation of the law. To the contention
of the unionists that they did not authorize the acts of their officers,
Justice Holmes replied: "It is a tax on credulity to ask anyone to
believe that members of labor unions at that time did not know that
the primary and secondary boycott and the use of the 'We Don't Pat-
ronize' or 'Unfair' list were means expected to be employed in the
effort to unionize shops . . . The jury could not but find that
by the usage of the unions the acts complained of were authorized
and authorized without regard to their interference with commerce
among the States."
This case although decided in 1915 was not tried under the Clay-
ton Act, because that statute was passed long after the commencement
of this suit. Whether the Clayton amendment will permit the courts
similarly to reach the funds of the unionists is a question which, at
present, is open to dispute.
RECENT DEcIsIoNs VIEWING BOYCOTT AS LEGAL. We next pro-
8s 235 U. S., 522-1915.
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ceed to a review of those cases which have shown a favorable legal
view of the boycott.
FRE.DOM OF SPEECH AND INSOLVENCY OF EMPLOYEES. Relat-
ing to this subject, the case of Marx and Haas Jeans Clothing
Co. v. Watson' is most important. The employees of the company
after numerous attempts to teach reasonable and agreeable terms
with their employers finally came to the conclusion that it was im-
possible. They decided, therefore, to boycott Marx and Haas, and
the two affiliated unions sent out notices of this boycott to the labor-
ing world and to other concerns who dealt with the company. The
notice was a calm, reasonable statement of the facts as the employees
saw them. It contained no intimidation nor threats, nor did the
officers and committees of the union resort to threats or violence of
any kind.
Marx and laas asked for an injunction against the publishing
of the boycott because irreparable damage would be done their busi-
ness by impecunious persons who could not answer in damages. The
injunction was refused on the grounds that to restrain the publishing
of these notices would be to violate the constitutional provisions which
permit absolute freedom of speech. Section 14 of the Bill of Rights
of Missouri declares that "no law shall be passed impairing the free-
doni of speech, that every person shall be free to say, write or publish
whatever he will on any subject, being responsible for all abuse of
that liberty." It is shown that the vital idea of that section is penalty
or punishment for such abuse and not prevention. This is clearly evi-
dent, for if prevention exists, then no opportunity can possibly arise
for one becoming responsible by saying or writing whatever he will.
The idea of preventing free speech or publication cannot possibly be
included within a broad general constitutional provision which grants
complete freedom to one "to say, write, or publish whatever he will
on any subject."
The Constitution explicitly recognizes these rights as now extst-
ing, and gives a perpetual guaranty that they will continue to exist.
Section 30 of the Constitution contains a guaranty of the right of
free speech, although it is here expressed only implicitly: "that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or p operty without due pro-
cess of law." The court proceeds to say concerning this section
that free speech is inevitably a permanent part and parcel of "liberty."
"These terms 'life', 'liberty', and 'property' are representative terms
and cover every right to which a member of the body politic is en-
$' 168 Mo., 133-1902.
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titled under the law. Within their comprehensive scope are embraced
the right of self-defense, freedom of speech, religious and political
freedom, exemption from arbitrary arrests, the right to buy and
sell as others may--all our liberties-personal, civil and political; in
short, all that makes life worth living and of none of these can anyone
be deprived, except by due process of law."
Section 14 of the Constitution makes no difference between a
proceeding set on foot to enjoin the publication of any other sort or
nature however injurious it may be. Since this is true, it therefore
follows that wherever the authority of the injunction begins, there
the right of free speech ends.
For the establishment of this view the laboring men and their
representatives through the American Federation of Labor have
striven with varying success. In the contempt cases, which grew in
part out of the Buck Stove Co. Case to which reference is made in
Part IV, unions have failed to win the courts over to their view.
The employer next made the contention that the damage which
was to result from the boycott was irreparable because of the insolv-
ency of the employees. The court held, however, that such a conten-
tion would mean that equity relief would issue only against the poor,
impecunious man, while no injun.tion could be granted against a
man who was financially able to stand a suit for damages. Thus only
the latter would have the right to freedom of speech, while the former,
the man without property, the oppressed and exploited laborer must
hold his tongue even if he be worked beyond endurance. The Consti-
tution of the State clearly denies that such a malicious difference
should be made. Such a distinction certainly takes away the basis
of the guarantee of equal rights to all citizens. The constitution makes
no difference between persons. The poor man "who hath not where
to lay his head," has as good a right to free speech as does the wealth-
iest man in the community. In short, in the language of Judge Sher-
wood, "the exercise of free speech, etc., is as free from outside inter-
ference or restriction as if so civil recovery could be had or punish-
ment inflicted because of its unwarranted exercise. . . . The au-
thority to enjoin finds no better harbor in the empty pocket of the
poor man than in the full pocket of the rich man. . . . If those
defendants are not permitted to tell this story of their wrongs, or, if
you please, their supposed wrongs, by word of mouth, or with pen or
print, and to endeavor to persuade others to aid them by all peaceable
means in securing redress of such wrongs, what becomes of free
speech, and what of personal liberty? The fact that in exercising
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that'freedom they thereby do plaintiff an actionable injury does not
go a hair toward a diminution of their right of free speech, for the
exercise of which, if resulting in such injury, the constitution makes
them expressly responsible. But such responsibility is utterly in-
compatible with authority in a court of equity to prevent such respon-
sibility from occurring."
The trade uniobsists, I think, have here a strong place for suc-
cessful resistance. Irreparable damages are not now a necessary con-
comitant with insolvency on the part of the employees, and the em-
ployer is then robbed of one of the most effective claims in a suit for
injunction. It will be increasingly difficult to show the irreparable
damage which is to result from the acts of the employees.
COMBINATION NOT UNLAWFUL PER S.-The case of Lindsay
and Co. v. Montana Federation of Labor" is the second impor-
tant case which takes a favorable legal view of the boy-
cott. In this case it was held that a combination of employees
to stop dealing with a wholesale fruit dealer and any who dealt
with him was not unlawful; that the act if valid when done by one
person is not made illegal when accomplished by a combination. In
precisely the same fashion as in the Marx and Haas case,' an injunc-
tion was refused against the publication of a boycotting circular on
the -grounds that the issuance of the injunction would violate the con-
stitutional provisions that every person shall be free to write or publish
whatever he will on any subject, being responsible for all abuse of
that liberty. Likewise the insolvency of the employees and of those
publishing the circular was held not to constitute sufficient grounds
for an injunction.
The question was further raised in this case as to what consti.
tuted unlawful intimidation and as to what protection a person may
have in his business interests. The following principle has been
clearly established from this decision according to a note in 18 L. R.
A., 707: "While a man is entitled to protection in his business
against unlawful acts or interference, yet he is not entitled to pro-
tection as against injuries which fairly flow from his own conduct.
The rights of the public, constitutional guarantees of freedom of
speech and a right of fair competition are superior to the right of the
individual to be protected in his business. In other words, the mere
fact that a person dependent on the public for patronage is having a
controversy with labor which will injure him in that patronage if
generally known does not entitle him to be protected from that injury
ST F. of L., Montana, 96 Pac. 127-1908.
"Cited Supra.
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by restraining the dissemination of the fact among his patrons that he
is engaged in such a controversy. If the publication of the fact of
the controversy hurts the man's business he should have thought of
that possibility when he entered the controversy. If, further, the publi-
cation keeps others from patronizing him because of a fear of of-
fending labor, he is not entitled thereby to protection. There must
be some intimidation, either direct or indirect. This is the crux of the
whole matter. Mere fear of loss which is not caused by any direct
or indirect threat other than moral suasion does not constitute intimi-
dation."
Finally, it must be again emphasized that the right of the indi-
vidual to publish such circulars in pursuance of his constitutional priv-
ilege is not lost in the combination. As Judge Hollaway concludes,
"If any one of these individuals could publish this circular they may
with equal security all join in its publication."
MATERIALITY OF MOTIVE AND OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES.
In the case of J. F. Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council,"
many issues vital to unionism were decided. In my estimation the ques-
tion of the materiality of the motive is the most important of these;
and I have accordingly placed this case under the above heading, al-
though other points will be discussed as they bear cogently upon the
boycott.
Here it was held that the mere enforcement by a building trades'
council of a rule which stated that members will not work with non-
union men or handle the product of their labor, by calling out its own
members from a plant which employes non-union men, and by notify-
ing the public that the plant is unfair--does not constitute a conspir-
acy to subject the plant to the union's control. Against such a con-
spiracy an injunction would clearly not issue. Under these circum-
stances the motive by which the unionists were moved was shown to
be immaterial. The court followed the reasoning of the New York
Court of Appeals in the National Protective Association case.40 In the
words of Chief Justice Beatty, "The general objects of the union ane
the trades' council being lawful, if they used no unlawful means for
their attainment, the motives which inspired their action in this case
are irrelevant to the question of consipracy and immaterial as affect-
ing the cause of action. . . . Any injury to a lawful business,
whether the result of a conspiracy or not, is prima facie actionable,
but may be defended on the ground that it was merely the result of a
lawful effort of the defendants to promote their own welfare (as in
s9 98 Pac., 1027-1908.
40 Cited in Part I, above.
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this case). To defeat this plea of justification, the plaintiff may offer
evidence that the acts of the defendants were inspired by express malice
and were done for the purpose of injuring plaintiff, and not to benefit
themselves."
The evidence in this case was held to constitute proof that the
unionists committed the acts for their own benefits. Further, the
Parkinson Co. based its claim for an injunction partly on the fact
that a business agent of a labor union had come upon their property
for the purpose of notifying the employees to strike. Since there had
been no threatened repetition of this act the court held that this
could be no ground for an injunction.
Again, it was shown that all the notices of the boycott had been
sent out by the unionists before the Parkinson Co. started its action
for the injunction. There was no valid evidence which showed that
there were threats to continue such sending of notices; and even if the
sending of notices for the purpose of breaking contracts was wrongful,
no injunction could issue unless there was some evidence that the
wrongful action was to be continued. In the words of the court: "An
injunction lies only to prevent threatened injury, and has no applica-
tion to wrongs which have been completed and for which the injured
party may obtain redress by an action at lawu"
With regard to these notices, the court held that the unionists
acted clearly within their rights when they notified contractors not to
buy from the Parkinson Co. because the union men would not work
their material for them--even if as a result of the notice contractors
cancelled contracts with Parkinson Co. Such notice was justifiable,
if on no other grounds, for the reason that the contractors were en-
titled to know the conditions concerning the refusal of the union men
to work the Parkinson material. The effect of these notices was
to enable the contractors and the Parkinson people to conduct their
future dealings on equal terms, and hence there was nothing wrongful
about them.
Finally, it was held that when representatives of the union pre-
sent to their former employees a plan by which they will return, such
action is not unlawful and no injunction can issue against it.
In Door Co. v. Fuelle,4 ' a boycott carried on by a car-
penters' union having for its purpose the intimidation of con-
tractors and builders from using building material manufactured in
plaintiff's planing mill, by prohibiting the union carpenters from work-
ing on any buildings in which plaintiff's materials are used, is a con-
4 215 Mo., 421-1908.
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spiracy and an unlawful combination to injure plaintiff, the purpose
of the boycott being to compel plaintiff to discharge all its non-union
laborers.
Here, the court views the acts of the combination as having such
injurious consequences upon the employers' business that in spite of
possible benefit to the union, the acts must be enjoined as distinct vio-
lation of property rights.
ARGUMENTS FOR LEGALITY OF BoYcon. In attempting to dem-
onstrate the legality of the boycott, various lines of reasoning
have been utilized. One radical group declares that the boycott
is legal because it is merely an exercise of the personal lib-
erties guaranteed by the constitution. Again, it has been maintained
that the mere fact that men combine to refrain from business dealings
with one does not make their acts in pursuance of such combination
any more unlawful than the acts of individuals. If it be to the legal
advantage of an individual to enter into 6r refrain from certain busi-
ness relations, any number of persons may act similarly together and
certainly be within their rights. The right of one to refrain includes
the right of ten thousand to refrain.
When by means of a boycott, many refrain from business dealings
in order to improve their condition, or from any other worthy motive.
then the person against whom the boycott is directed cannot be said
to suffer any real or legal loss (that is loss for which damages can be
recovered). This may be clearly understood when it is remembered
that a person cannot lose something if he has never had it. In a boy-
cotted industry, it is true that an opportunity for gain is denied the
entrepreneur, but that is not strictly a loss.
When it is proposed to enjoin the boycott because it is an unwar-
rantable attack upon property rights which leads to irreparable damage,
it is answered that the mutual relationship of buying and selling is in
no proper sense of the word a property right.
The right of property has been defined" as "that sole and despotic
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things
of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual
in the universe." Sound judgment prevents anyone from declaring
that buying and selling, if it be a voluntary relationship, can be a
property right in this sense. Who will maintain that A has "sole and
despotic dominion" over the selling of his product? Who will be
so blind as to fail to grasp the significance and importance of com-
petition, in so far as it alters the control of a man over his product?
42 Black's Law Dictionary.
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If plain business competition can take away a concern's trade, why
cannot some other method, if it is fairly within the law? The man
who goes into business assumes the risk of failure together with the
chances of success. If failure comes, it is his risk, so long as it comes
from the refusal of others to buy whether they refuse because they
prefer the article manufactured by his competitor or because they are
attempting to improve their own welfare and livelihood. It is the
producer's loss, but it is not a loss for which those who refuse to be
purchasers can be held legally responsible.
The question of combination, as demonstrated by the Parkinson
case, is now no longer the determining issue. Recent thought, as evi-
denced both from the court decisions and from the opinion of most
intelligent men, holds to the view that combination should be regulated
and controlled rather than dissolved and abolished. The trend of mod-
em industry moves toward combination with as much justice and
right as in that of capital. To grasp this fundamental principle is but
to commence the solution of a difficult problem. What acts particular
combinations may perform must be left to the decisions of courts in
cases referring and relating to specific issues.
THZ BLAKcisT. Briefly stated, the law is that blacklisting is il-
legal. However, in Adair v. United States'3 that part of the Erdman
Act which made it illegal to discharge a workman, because of his affil-
iations with a labor organization was declared unconstitutional. In gen-
eral, moreover, it is extremely difficult to prove the existence of the
blacklist, since in its most effective form it is secret.
IRL B. ROSENBLUM.
(To be concluded in next number.)
' 28 U. S., 161-190.
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